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BY MICHAIL M. VIKTOROV.
SO much has been said and written in America and Europe con-
cerning the role of Russia in the present "World War," and
concerning the white czar's plans, intentions and purposes as the ally
and defender of western culture, that a candid article on Russia
from the pen of one qualified to speak should possess some interest,
at least to candid minds. The present writer is of Russian birth
though long: since naturalized and Americanized—an American
without a hyphen (as he flatters himself) who, however, has not
lost his profound sympathy with and concern for Russian progress,
nor his affection for the land and people oppressed and misgoverned
by the autocracy and bureaucracy of Petrograd.
Let it be said by way of introduction as briefly as possible that
the writer hurriedly left Russia when a mere youth of nineteen, not
to seek a fortune in "the land of promise," not to better his eco-
nomic condition, which at that time was fairly satisfactory, not
to gratify any desire for adventure and change, but solely in order
to save his life and liberty for what he trusted would be a career
of modest ser\'ice. He was a student and as such a member of a
secret politico-cultural society in one of the leading provincial
cities. The society, like many others, had for its object the political
and economic emancipation of Russia or, as the government's ofiicial
prosecutors always put it, "the subversion of the existing order."
The secret society was actually Cjuite harmless ; the members
were mere boys and girls who were proud of their nominal and
slender connection with a mysterious, awe-inspiring central revo-
lutionary body in the capital and who had no thought of political
crime. They called themselves "terrorists," it is true, and they
knew enough of Marx, Lasalle, French Utopian socialism and Brit-
ish practical socialism of the Robert Owen school to regard them-
selves as Social Democrats of a somewhat nondescript species, but
they did nothing and planned nothing in the way of terror. They
devoured "underground" literature ; they read the radical journalism
of the day, Russian and European, and they sought to "convert"
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other boys and girls to their style of thinking. They collectetl
money occasionally for "the cause," giving theatrical performances
and concerts, selling revolutionary journals and pamphlets, and
giving away some of their own pocket money. Most of them were
Gymnasium or Rcalscliule students, and some were college fresh-
men. A few—very few—were skilled workmen or apprentices,
and these were cordially welcomed by the "bourgeois" and "intellec-
tual" members who were supported by their respective parents and
who ardently admired the self-supporting, hard-toiling, noble and
independent "proletarians."
A reasonat or humane government would not have taken
such youthful, dreamy "revolutionists" too seriously, nor punished
them mercilessly for their political activities and "plots." But
whenever the government, acting on information supplied by spies
or careless friends, arrested the members of such a group, the
slightest evidence of revolutionary affiliations or activities sufficed
to secure savage verdicts—banishment to Siberia with labor in the
mines, solitary confinement in filthy prisons that often led to in-
sanity, and even the gallows. The agents of the Russian govern-
ment sometimes absolutely run amuck and act like infuriated mad-
men. When they are in one of these panic moods nobody is safe,
and no allowance is made for youth, inexperience, juvenile enthu-
siasm, naivete, ignorance and rashness.
Now, it happened that the secret society to which the writer
belonged committed certain glaring indiscretions in the way of
"propaganda," and the police apprehended several of its active
members, including the "librarian" or keeper of the illegal books.
A list of members' and patrons' names was found in the librarian's
room. Those arrested had to take their medicine ; two were tried
and sent to Siberia, and two others received prison terms. But the
leaders of the society decided to induce several other "suspects"
to escape ; they wisely thought that the provincial secret society
had not done enough to resign itself to needless sacrifices and to
justify the surrender of more victims to the cruel government.
The writer, with several others, was urged to take a train at mid-
night and make his way to the Austrian frontier, which was not
too distant. Money was somehow found ; no other preparations
were possible ; not even a farewell to parents and intimate friends
was to be thought of. The idea, moreover, was pressed upon them
that Russia needed workers abroad as well as at home, and that
even exiles had important patriotic tasks, educational and practical,
cut out for them. Not without reluctance, not without doubts, the
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writer and his comrades took leave of their native soil and made
their way, without a passport and with much danger and difficulty,
into western Europe and later to America.
Much has happened since that time in Russian life and politics.
But what of the government? What of Russian freedom and
civilization? What of the cause of reform and progress? Where
do we in the west stand with reference to the still mysterious and
unknown empire of the czar? To these questions let me now turn.
Russia has been described as a land of the most amazing con-
trasts. One meets in her the noblest and truest '^ulture as well as
the nakedest and most revolting savagery, the aest education as
well as the darkest superstition and the extre'mest ignorance, the
utmost gentleness and charity as well as the most ferocious brutal-
ity. The truth is, there are several Russias not only in the familiar
geographical sense, but in the unfamiliar moral and cultural sense.
One of the Russias has no enemies ; it is the Russia of Tourgeniev,
of Tolstoy, of Gogol, of Kropotkin, of Tschekhoif, of Tchaikowski,
of Tchernishevski. It is the Russia that has all her windows open
to true western culture,—the Russia that is European, that recog-
nizes the great need of domestic reform in every direction, and that
has for several decades so eagerly and so profitably studied the best
thought of Europe.
Another of the Russias is the Russia of the peasantry and the
proletariat uncorrupted by the spies and the agents provocateurs of
the autocracy. It is the Russia of the Mir, the Artiel (ancient forms
of co-operation, which a benevolent and progressive government
would have made every effort to protect and to perpetuate), the
religious dissenters, the haters of official and stereotyped dogma
and of bitter persecution in the name of the Christian faith. This
Russia likewise has no enemies and many friends and well-wishers.
But there is still another Russia, the Russia of the tyrannical
rulers, the selfish, perversa bureaucratic cliques, the idle and useless
grand dukes, the systematic grafters, the reactionary fanatics, the
captains of the Black Hundreds, the organizers of "pogroms," the
active and reckless apostles of hate and inhumanity. This is the
Russia of the czars, of ministers like Plehve and Stolypin, of violent
anti-Semitic and anti-German and anti-European newspapers, of
hangmen and torturers. This is the Russia that makes war and
concludes peace, that negotiates secret treaties, that crushes national-
ities and races, that destroys every vestige of freedom at home and
abroad. It is with this Russia that the world, alas, has had to
reckon, and still has to reckon.
338 THE OPEN COURT.
We shall presently glance at the recent record of this Russia.
But before doing this it is well to pause and advert to the view of
certain British liberals and liberal conservatives—a view not shared
by other liberals or by laborites and radicals, by the way—that this
Russia, the Russia of the white terror, of blood and guilt and un-
restrained barbarism, is about to purge and reform herself, to
abandon her evil ways, to repent of her crimes and atrocities, to
take her place at the forefront of civilization and become a worthy
exemplar and exponent of culture. A real Russian scholar, Pro-
fessor Vinogradoff—an exile, by the way, who has held a chair in
history at Oxford for many years—has called the war "a war of
emancipation" for Russia, and the same expression has been used
by other Russians. What do they mean? From whom did or does
Russia as a power need to emancipate herself? Who has attacked
her sovereign rights, and when? The Russian people need to be
emancipated from their autocratic government and their incompe-
tent and corrupt bureaucracy ; but did the ruling spheres of Russia
contemplate such emancipation when they took up Servia's cause
last summer? Can it be said that Russia is in the present conflict
because of her conscious or unconscious desire to overthrow or
reform her governmental system? Any such statement is absurd
on its face. Either by evolution or by revolution
—
probably by
both—Russia will in the course of time emancipate herself, but her
enemies are chiefly within her own household. There is not a
liberal or progressive person in Europe who has not sympathized
with the reform movement in the czar's dominions, and if any des-
potic or reactionary clique in any other country had ever openly es-
poused the cause of Russian tyranny and obscurantism, the people of
that country would have sharply resented and effectually nullified such
aid and comfort to a foe of human freedom and human progress.
But let the strange and vague references to the "war of eman-
cipation" be dismissed as the product of some confusion of thought
and looseness of expression. A much more important point is to
be noted here. If the Russian government, because of its alliance
with France, England and Italy, is to turn over a new leaf, to repent
and mend its ways, to turn liberal and forward-looking, assuredly
this is the time to proclaim its intention, to announce the glad tidings.
The opportunity has, however, been totally neglected. Immediately
after the outbreak of the war a number of meant-to-be significant
hints did appear in the British papers and in their Russian cor-
respondence. The world was told, darkly, that great and joyful
news might be expected from the Russian capital at any moment
—
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news that would vindicate Russia's government and make it alto-
gether worthy of its allies. Especially positive and convinced was the
London Saturday Reviciv, the high Tory organ of Britain, that
momentous internal reforms were imminent in Russia, and its read-
ers were encouraged to anticipate wonderful happenings. All such
predictions and forecasts have ceased. A change has come over
the spirit of Russian correspondence and comment. In some Eng-
lish organs of opinion there are expressions of impatience, dis-
appointment and indignation. Can we feel any astonishment at
this? Let us see what the Russian government might have done,
ivould certainly have done, had it intended to reverse its politics,
and has utterly failed to do.
In the first place, it would have proclaimed wide and liberal
amnesty for the majority of its political prisoners. Many fully
expected such a step as this. Has it been taken? Not only has it
not been taken, but when Bourtsefif, the famous exile and successful
assailant of the Russian police espionage system, with its terrorist
adjuncts and its complicity in assassinations and crimes, returned
voluntarily and impulsively to his native land last fall to place his
ability and energy at the service of the government, he was cast
into prison, promptly tried for treason and sentenced to a term in
Siberia. The same fate overtook other revolutionists who had
rashly reckoned without their Russian host and had assumed that
the war meant a new regime at home and a change of heart on
the part of the "popular" czar and the "heroic" commander-in-
chief of all the armies. It should be stated that the treatment of
Bourtseff was a deep shock to the British radicals, although they
deemed it discreet to restrain their wrath and make their criticism
mild and cautious.
In the second place, the government would have discontinued
its policy of compulsory Russianization of Finland, of nullification
of Finnish autonomy and liberty, and would have restored at least
some of the high privileges that it had taken away from Finland
contrary to solemn treaties and pledges. Has this been done? On
the contrary, the Russianization of Finland appears to have con-
tinued without interruption or relaxation.
In the third place, equal right and equal opportunity in every
direction would have been granted to the oppressed Jewish millions
of Russia. Several hundred thousand Jews are fighting in the
czar's armies
;
fighting without enthusiasm, interest or faith. They
are sufifering and dying for a government that denies to their people
the right to own land in rural sections, the right to till the soil, the
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right to enter certain professions, the right to educate their children,
the right to settle in any section of Russia that is not set apart as
a "zone" for them. They are suffering and dying for a government
that treats them as outcasts and pariahs ; that has instigated mas-
sacres and pogroms against them ; that has slandered and libeled
them ; that has accused them of ritual murders, and that has re-
warded insane degenerate monks and frenzied fanatics for virulent
and truculent attacks on the whole Jewish race. Has anything been
done for the Jews of Russia? Not a single, insignificant measure
of amelioration has been vouchsafed to them. The campaign of
persecution has not been suspended. And it has been charged that
in Poland and Galicia the Russian generals and commanders have
executed hundreds of Jews and brutally maltreated hundreds of
others merely because of alleged suspicions that they had given in-
formation to the military enemy or had failed to give information
to their own rulers, permanent or temporary.
In the fourth place, the Russian government might and would
have granted actual autonomy to her own Polish provinces, instead
of vaguely promising autonomy to a reunited Poland after the war
in the event of Russian annexation of the Austrian and German
parts of the old kingdom of Poland. This has not been done, either,
and the American and other free Poles, it is plain from their actions
and utterances, have little confidence in the promises of the Russian
government. A manifesto appears to have been issued promising
Russian Poland local self-government and the right to use her own
tongue in the schools and elsewhere ; but even Russian correspon-
dents have thrown much doubt on the value and practical signifi-
cance of this grant. They speak of conditions, reservations and
restrictions that may break the promise to the heart even if it should
be kept to the ear. Moreover, the Council of State may tack on
additional limitations.
In the fifth place, the Russian people might have been granted
some general measure of social and political liberty as a promise of
greater things to come. Nothing whatever has been done by the
government in the direction of reform. The government is what
it has been. It has not seen fit, even during so soul-trying a conflict,
to make a single concession to the spirit of liberalism. It has re-
mained deaf to progressive appeal and advice ; it has sullenly re-
sisted every effort on the part of the most moderate reformers to
convert the war into an instrument and agency of national progress.
What reason, then, has the Russian government given to any
one for the belief or notion that it means to inaugurate an era of
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reform and become a modern, enlightened, liberal government?
The answer is, None. Can ground for such belief or hope be found
in its general record, in the history of the last thirty or forty years ?
Is the Russian government better and saner in times of peace than in
times of war? Let us see.
Prior to the war with Japan and the revolution of 1904-5,
as all will admit, there was nothing in the conduct and policies
of the Russian government to inspire respect, confidence or ad-
miration. It had systematically suppressed all liberal and pro-
gressive activities and aspirations with a ruthless hand. It had
driven young dreamers and idealists, whose sole desire and purpose
it was to serve the peasant and proletariat millions, to rebel and
adopt terrorist tactics. It had made popular education a crime
and an assault on the "existing order." It had forbidden the dis-
cussion of political and governmental problems, and had ordered
all the best books of modern times to be placed on its "Index." It
had remorselessly imprisoned and banished editors and publishers
for daring to disobey capricious and stupid police orders. It had
so savagely suppressed the moderate reform societies and the labor
unions that when these became revolutionary its reprisals and
vindictive penalties knew no checks or bounds.
All this inevitably begot irresponsibility, lust, cruelty and cor-
ruption in government. The local satraps vied with one another in
proving their loyalty to the autocracy. Bribery, waste, lawless
official arrogance, rank favoritism, ignorance and brutality reigned
in the empire, from one end to the other. Thousands of noble
men and women were in prisons and fortresses or in the wilds of
Siberia. Other thousands were forced to seek refuge in Europe
and America. Russia had no room and no use for the best that
she was capable of producing. The best only furnished victims for
the gallows and the hangmen.
Revolution was unavoidable. It had to come sooner or later.
The events of the eighties and nineties of the last century could
have no other climax than a catastrophic upheaval. The war with
Japan merely hastened the revolution. Russia's crushing defeats
and disasters on land and sea only attested the bankruptcy of the
regime, the dishonesty and the inefficiency of the military, naval
and civil agents of the autocracy. The government was so com-
pletely discredited that the revolutionary forces saw their chance
and took it. The army was thousands of miles away ; the war had
no supporters or defenders among the people ; the labor unions
could use the strike weapon without fear of the knout and the
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bayonet. The intellectual and professional elements were free to
make common cause with the proletariat. The revolution followed,
and then the apparent surrender of the autocracy, the imperial
rescripts and decrees proclaiming reforms, the Witte ministry, the
grant of a so-called constitution, the creation of a national Duma
and the assembling thereof. For a short time Russia enjoyed free
speech and free discussion. The government was weak and the
bureaucracy disorganized and dismayed.
But, alas, the peace treaty with Japan came too soon—too soon
for the cause of Russian progress and the peace and welfare of the
nation. The army returned and the autocracy recovered its audacity
and its Bourbon stubbornness. The counter-revolution was not long
in making its appearance. The concessions extorted from the autoc-
racy were one by one withdrawn or nullified. The so-called "Fun-
damental Laws," or constitution, received the sam^ cavalier and
contemptuous treatment. The local satraps ignored the paper re-
straints on arbitrary power. The country was placed under martial
law in order to get rid of inconvenient legal limitations. The first
Duma was dissolved with little ceremony, not because, as the gov-
ernment pretended, it was "inefiicient and incapable of service,"
but because it was fearless and honest, because it protested vehe-
mently against the reactionary and nullification policies of the court.
The electoral system was changed in violation of the laws the czar
had signed and proclaimed. The object of this illegal change was
to convert the Duma into an instrument of the aristocratic and
privileged classes, and to reduce the representation of the liberals,
the organized workmen and the peasants.
Other and similar measures followed in rapid succession. The
freedom of speech and the press guaranteed by the Constitution
became a snare and a mockery. Even the parliamentary debates
could not be reported outside of the capital. Provincial editors
were fined and imprisoned for republishing articles and reports
which had appeared, with the censor's approval, in the newspapers
of St. Petersburg or Moscow. The Duma itself was in serious
danger. The leaders of the Black Hundreds urged the czar to
abolish it and with it every vestige of the brief reform period.
These fanatics had the support of the influential ministers and
bureaucrats, and the liberals were fully prepared for a perfidious
decree wiping out the Duma and the constitution. It is believed
that nothing but shame, fear of European opinion, and the need of
foreign money saved the Duma as an institution.
But although the Duma was saved, it was reduced to impotence.
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The cabinet regarded it as a subordinate agency that might do
routine work and meekly carry out the orders of the government.
It was useful as a blind or mask ; it passed budgets and authorized
bond issues. It was deprived of all real power ; its bills had no
chance whatever in the upper chamber or Council of State. All its
reform measures were foredoomed to failure. It found every way
blocked. It could not help the Finns, or the Jews, or the Poles. It
could do little for popular education or for simple justice and per-
sonal liberty. Meantime the ruling cliques, intrenched once more, were
diverting national attention, to the the extent of their ability, to sham
issues, to alleged external dangers. Attacks on Germany began to
appear in the inspired press. Anti-Semitic and anti-Polish cam-
paigns were instigated. The government demanded extraordinary
appropriations for defense and preparedness. A "National" party
was formed to back the government. The true liberals and non-
revolutionary radicals opposed all this and exposed the stratagems
and tricks of the government so far as the censors and the prose-
cutors permitted criticism. But this opposition was of little avail.
Jingoism and intolerant nationalism steadily made headway. Yet
the abuses in the army and navy—the things that had caused the de-
feat of Russia in the war with Japan—were hardly touched. It was
"unpatriotic" to tell the truth about the cabals and the corruptionists
that controlled these services. Even moderate suggestions of army
and navy reform were frowned upon and denounced.
This was the general situation in Russia on the eve of the
present war. The liberal elements were profoundly pessimistic and
disheartened. Many predicted the revival of the terrorist movement
and revolutionary outbreaks all over the empire. The students and
youth of the country appeared to be ready for another great wave
of intense and tragic political activity. The best informed Russians,
as well as sober-minded' European observers, entertained but little
doubt that the reaction or counter-revolution was heaping up ex-
plosive material and that another sanguinary upheaval against the
Russian autocracy and bureaucracy was imminent. Some did not
hesitate to say that a popular war alone would save the government
and avert revolution. But was a popular war possible? The war
with Japan had been extremely unpopular, and another such con-
flict might be absolutely fatal to the old regime. The course of the
two Balkan wars afforded no opportunity to the Russian .court.
Its diplomacy had made enemies rather than friends in the Balkan
peninsula. It was necessary to wait. Delay was dangerous, but
there was no alternative. For, to repeat, the return to reform and
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liberalism did not for a moment present itself to the ruling cliques
in the light of a possible alternative.
The Austrian ultimatum to Servia, one of "the little Slav
brothers," gave the czar and his intimate advisers and agents their
opportunity. They knew that a war over the question of Serb in-
dependence or sovereignty, and over Russia's moral claim to a
sort of Slav protectorate, would be popular.
The rest is familiar history. Into the actual responsibility for
the awful conflict the writer will not go in this article. He merely
wishes to record the facts and to direct attention once more to the
spirit and attitude of the Russian government with reference to
reform, culture and civilization. So far, certainly, the war has not
been a war of "emancipation" for the Russian people, or for any
race or nationality subject to Russia. Further developments—good
or bad—it would be unprofitable to speculate upon ; comment may
well await accomplished results.
However, in dealing with Russia's role and function in the
present war, it is necessary to bear in mind one important fact
—
namely, that the Slavophil professions of the government and some
of its literary spokesmen are essentially hollow and insincere. Slavo-
philism and Pan-Slavism as literary and historical factors in Russia
are one thing; official and autocratic patronage of the smaller Slav
states and principalities is a very different thing. The autocracy
and its diplomatic tools have used the Pan-Slav idea, have exploited
it, but have never shown any real belief in it except as another and
less objectionable slogan for expansion and increased power and
prestige. The idealistic Pan-Slav group, never very large or potent,
was at one time intellectually and morally respectable. It had
curious, semi-mystical and irrational notions, but it was honest. It
believed that Russia had a sacred mission in the world ; that she
was working out a new civilization ; that the west was effete and
degenerate ; that democracy, freedom, modern industrialism, indi-
vidual rights and all the rest were false and destructive of true
spiritual grace ; that a benevolent, religious, divine autocracy was
to be Russia's unique contribution to progress ; that Europe and
America would ultimately, after many troubles and anarchical dis-
orders, adopt the Russian form of government. This was foolish
and absurd, but it was historically explicable and it was honest. It
hardly needs explaining why the autocracy and bureaucracy always
welcomed this Slavophil doctrine and gospel. It was a good cloak
for tyranny, for reaction, for Bourbon opposition to "western"
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ideas. The fervent Slavophils played into the hands of the blind,
selfish, corrupt and cruel autocracy, but few of them perceived this.
The Russian liberals, the radicals, the social democrats and the
other progressive parties and schools, have never shared a single
one of the notions of the genuine Slavophils, and they have, of
course, always perceived and pointed out how the government per-
verted Slavophil ideas and converted them, so to speak, to its own
pernicious use. But the Slavophil poets and essayists had little
interest in territorial ambitions and in schemes of annexation ; they
really had the welfare of the peasant and laborer afheart, and they
hoped to render the government benevolent and pure. To-day the
old Slavophil school can hardly be said to have a following worthy
of mention. The doctrine that Holy Russia has a great message
for the world, is going to teach us how to make the autocratic church
truly religious and the autocratic state truly benevolent—how to
reconcile things the West deemed irreconcilable—is dead. No one
takes it seriously.
The educated and progressive classes are patriotic in the ra-
tional sense of the term, but they have no illusions concerning Holy
Russia. They know that Russia must continue to follow the West,
to grapple with her political, social and moral problems as the
West has grappled with these problems, and to curb and shackle
her autocracy and her bureaucracy. Russia has many schools of
thought, as the W^est has, but the alignment is the same there as
with us. Russsia has positivists, monists, Kantists, Hegelians, neo-
realists, Bergsonians and what not. She has socialists and indi-
vidualists and opportunists. Russia has been profoundly influenced
by German thought-—her greatest critic was a Hegelian, and some
of her leading authors and economists are Marxians. But all these
schools have this in common—they regard Russia as a backward
power whose development must follow the western course of evo-
lution. They wish to be national and to cultivate whatever worthy
traits the Russian character may possess, but they have nothing
but contempt for the notion that Russia can dispense with free in-
stitutions, with free criticism, with western culture. They have no
sympathy with aggression and bigoted nationalism, with any policy
that spells reaction within or greed and conquest without.
These elements will judge the war and its political or territorial
consequences by one criterion—the political, social and moral prog-
ress of Russia. They will not long be deceived. There can be no
change in their point of view, their philosophy of life.
